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This paper examines whether social security programs induce a withdrawal of the elderly from 
the labor force and create jobs for the young in Japan. The key messages are summarized as 
follows. First, our historical overview suggests that young unemployment issues have not 
motivated social security reforms and that changes in provisions are not endogenous. 
Second, employment of the young tends to be positively, not negatively, associated with the 
LFP of the old. Third, an increase in the inducement to retire significantly discourages the 
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   The current speed of aging in Japan is unprecedented, and is far more rapid than in 
other developed countries. The proportion of the old defined as those aged 65 and over 
was 4.9 percent of the total population in 1950, increased to 12.5 percent in 1990, and 
further reached 20.2 percent in 2005, implying that one-fifth of the population is currently 
occupied by the old (National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 
(NIPSSR), 2007)
1. Population aging will continue into the future, and even accelerate. 
According to the latest population projection released by the NIPSSR in December 2006, 
the share of those aged 65 years and above is expected to reach 30.5 percent of the total 
population in 2025, and further increase to 39.6 percent in 2050. 
The rapid pace of population aging has raised concerns about the sustainability of the 
current programs and stimulated a series of major pension reforms since the mid-1980s, 
which called for a rise of eligibility ages, a reduction of benefit levels, and a rise of 
contribution rates. The latest reform in 2004 has extended the eligibility age from 60 to 65 
by 2025, and introduced an automatic adjustment of benefit levels, due to demographic 
and macro-economic factors, to cope with the expected increase of benefits and 
deteriorating fiscal balances. 
Naturally, these reforms are likely to have affected the labor supply of the elderly, and 
possibly of the non-elderly. Thus, an interesting question is to quantify the effects of social 
security programs on labor market outcomes for both the old and the young: Does a 
generous social security program provide jobs for the young by encouraging the old to exit 
the labor market? Does a rise in the eligibility age make the old stay longer in the work 
                                                      
1  The United Nations defines a society in which people aged 65 and above account for more than seven percent 
as one that is aging, and a society in which this age group shares more than fourteen percent as one that is 
aged. It took only twenty-four years for Japan to move from being an aging society to an aged one, while it 
took more than fifty years for most Western countries. 
  1place and crowd out the young? When addressing these issues, we have to keep in mind 
the possibility of the endogeneity of changes in social security programs with respect to the 
employment or unemployment of the young. Fortunately, it is unlikely that endogeneity is 
an issue in Japan because the timings of reforms are exogenously determined regardless 
of economic and demographic circumstances. 
This paper examines whether social security programs in Japan induce a withdrawal of 
the elderly from the labor force, and create jobs for the young. Our discussions proceed as 
follows. Section 2 provides a historical overview of social security reforms and employment 
policies toward the elderly. Section 3 presents the long-term employment and 
unemployment trends of both the old and the young, and performs a regression analysis to 
examine the direct relationship between the employment of the young and that of the old. 
Section 4 examines whether changes in social security programs are associated with the 
employment of the young or the old using measures for the inducement to retire. Section 5 
concludes. The two appendices provide a detailed description of data construction and 
sources of the main variables used in this study.   
 
2. Background   
 
2.1 Social security reforms 
This section provides historical information on social security reforms and employment 
policies for the elderly. We focus on what their main purposes have been and whether the 
prospect of creating jobs for the young has played a large role in the policy debate.   
Table 1 overviews the directions of past social security reforms in terms of the benefits 
of the Employees’ Pension Insurance (EPI; Kosei Nenkin) and National Pension Insurance 
(NPI; Kokumin Nenkin), which are at the core of the public pension scheme in Japan (see 
  2Section  4 for more details).
2 Both EPI and NPI Laws require benefit and contribution 
schemes to be reviewed every five years (at least) from the viewpoint of financial balances 
and their sustainability, so the timing of social security reform is exogenously determined 
regardless of economic, demographic, and other conditions.   
Until the early 1970s, the main purpose of the major social security reforms had been 
consistently to raise benefits levels, aiming to improve income levels of elderly persons in 
line with the rising average standard of living under rapid economic growth. The 
government had continued to raise the benefit multiplier for the wage-proportional benefit 
and/or the benefit unit for its flat-rate benefit, and it also introduced wage and price 
indexation to the benefits in 1973. 
However, slower economic growth from the mid-1970s and a rapid and continuous drop 
in the fertility rate raised concerns about the financial sustainability of social security 
programs. The 1985 Reform was revolutionary in that it incorporated a reduction in the 
benefit multiplier and flat-rate benefit for the first time, aiming to hold down an increase in 
total pension benefits. Under rising concerns about demographic pressures, subsequent 
reforms have continued to seek to improve the financial balances of the programs by 
reducing the benefit multiplier, scaling down benefit indexations, and extending eligibility 
ages, as well as raising the premium rate. 
Figure 1 depicts the eligibility ages for EPI benefits: the top panel applies to male 
beneficiaries and the bottom panel to female beneficiaries. In the case of male pensioners, 
the eligibility age for both flat rate and wage-proportional benefits was raised to 60 in 1973 
from the previous 55, and then stayed there until 2000. Since 2001, the eligibility age for 
the flat-rate component has been scheduled to increase by one year for every three years 
                                                      
2  See Komamura (2007) for more details. EPI and NPI cover 48.0 and 45.5 percent of the population insured 
by public pension programs. The Mutual Aid Insurance (Kyosai Nenkin) covers the remaining 6.5 percent, 
most of whom are employees in the public sector and private schools. 
  3to 65 in 2013, while the eligibility age for the wage-proportional component will remain at 60. 
In addition, the eligibility age for the wage-proportional component is scheduled to rise by 
one year every three years from 2013, reaching 65 in 2025. For female beneficiaries, the 
eligibility age had been 55 until 1985, and then was gradually raised to 60 in 1999 to catch 
up with men. Their eligibility ages are set to increase, albeit with a five-year lag for men: 
from 2006 for the flat-rate benefit and from 2018 for the wage-proportional benefit.   
In Japan, there has been no eligibility age that is exactly equivalent to a so-called “early 
retirement” age widely observed in other advanced countries, and there has been no 
attempt to lower the eligibility age. However, there is a means-tested Zaishoku pension 
scheme for the EPI program, which is applied to those who stay in the labor force after the 
eligibility age. Some preceding research studies find disincentive effects of this scheme on 
the willingness of the elderly to work, but its impact on the overall labor force of the elderly 
remains mixed and is yet to be examined in detail.   
 
2.2 Employment policies for the elderly 
The employment policies for the elderly have been reformed in accordance with social 
security reforms, especially aiming to expand job opportunities for the elderly whose 
eligibility ages were extended. For example, the government revised the Employment 
Measures Law in 1973 to include a declaration clause on raising the mandatory retirement 
age and to introduce a subsidy paid to employers who extend the mandatory retirement 
age to 60. In 1986, the Law Concerning Stabilization of Employment of Older Persons 
introduced a new endeavor clause on extending the mandatory retirement age to 60 or 
over, and changed it as the obligatory target. 
This trend of extending the mandatory retirement age continued. In response to a 
scheduled rise in the eligibility age for EPI benefits in the 1994 Pension Reform, the 
  4government established a new type of wage subsidy, Continued Employment Benefit for 
Older Workers, to compensate for the reduced wages of older workers who continue to be 
employed after the mandatory retirement age.  This wage  subsidy  is intended  to 
encourage  the  old  to  continue working after retiring from their primary jobs,  rather 
than extending the mandatory retirement age. The government also revised the 
Employment Measures Law in 2000 and 2004, which includes an obligatory clause that 
requires firms to raise the mandatory retirement age to 65 or above by 2013 or to 
completely abolish it. 
As a result, the distribution of mandatory retirement ages has been changing 
substantially over the past decades as demonstrated in Figure 2, which is based on the 
“Survey on Employment Management” (Koyo Kanri Chosa) compiled by the Ministry of 
Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW). The share of firms that had a mandatory retirement 
scheme was less than 50 percent until around 1980, and a significant portion of those firms 
set the retirement age at 55. After that, the proportion of firms with mandatory retirement 
steadily increased to above 90 percent in the mid-1990s. The most dominant retirement 
age is now 60, and some firms have started extending it further to 65
3.  
 
2.3 Current issues 
As suggested by our brief overview on social security reforms and employment policies for 
the elderly, there has been virtually no policy intention among Japanese policymakers to 
link the employment of old and young. Their main concern has consistently been how to 
encourage the old to stay longer in the labor market in accordance with a rise in the 
eligibility age for pension benefits. Contrary to some European countries, which observe 
                                                      
3 It should be noted that this survey covers only firms employing 30 and more workers, and many smaller firms 
have no mandatory retirement age. 
  5active policy debates to use social security provisions to create jobs for the young, there 
seem to have been virtually no such arguments in Japan both in the policy arena and in 
academia. This observation supports the view that changes to social security programs in 
Japan have not been endogenous with respect to the employment of the young, and that 
any change in specific provisions has not been correlated with job creation for the young.   
   To be sure, unemployment among the young has been rising sharply since the early 
1990s, reflecting the sluggish economy, which made firms more cautious about recruiting 
new graduates under strong cost-cutting pressures. The unemployment rate for those aged 
15-24 was around five percent in the early 1990s and has tracked an upward trend during 
the decade, reaching 10.3 percent in 2003
4. Similar to some European countries that suffer 
from a high unemployment rate among the young, the historically high level of 
unemployment among the young captured a lot of political and social attention in Japan. 
Indeed, several policy measures have been proposed to increase job opportunities for the 
young, such as provision of job skills, expansion of temporary workers, and strengthening 
job matching for the young. However, the deteriorated labor market conditions for the 
young has not front-loaded social security reforms or induced the government to provide 
job opportunities through legislative changes on plan provisions.   
One of the important reasons for the absence of debate in Japan, we speculate, is that 
employment of the old and that of the young are not substitutes. The Japanese labor 
market is characterized by the prevalence of a long-term employment practice (called 
“lifetime employment”). A large volume of previous studies discusses how Japanese firms, 
especially larger ones, hire new school graduates and that most of workers stay with the 
same firm for decades to gain firm-specific human capital that contributes to the 
                                                      
4 The unemployment rate for those aged 15-24 resumed its fall in 2004, but remained at around eight percent, 
well above the average during the early 1990s. 
  6productivity of the firm (see Aoki, Patrick and Sheard, 1994). Shimizutani and Yokoyama 
(2008) show that the average years of tenure of Japanese workers became even longer 
after 1990 under the long recession. These arguments suggest that there is a large 
productivity gap between young and older workers, and that thus they are not substitutes.   
 
3. Long-term employment trends 
 
3.1 Three age groups 
This section graphically overviews the long-term trends of employment and unemployment 
by age bracket in Japan since 1960. We present the employment trends of three age 
groups in terms of three employment measures (labor force participation, employment, and 
unemployment), pooling genders. The data construction and data sources of the main 
variables in this section are explained in Appendix 1.   
In what follows, to examine if employment of the old “crowds-out” employment of 
younger persons we define three age groups: “young” (aged 20-24), “prime age” (aged 
25-54), and “old” (aged 55-69) as follows. 
z  “Young” refers to people aged 20-24.Of those graduating from high school, about half 
continue on to junior colleges and universities  (51 percent in 2007). Most students 
complete undergraduate programs by the age of 24. Unfortunately, there are no official 
data on the number of people enrolled in schools by age, so we tentatively assume 
that those who are out of the labor force at ages 20-24 are in school (colleges, 
graduate, and vocational schools). 
z  “Prime age” refers those aged 25-54. They form the core of the labor force in Japan.  
The mandatory retirement age had been 55 for 20 percent or more of total employed 
workers until the mid-1980s (see later).   
  7z  “Old” refers to those aged 55-69. The mandatory retirement age was extended from 55 
to 60 in the 1990s, and now is in a transition process to 65, although adoption of the 
mandatory retirement age of 65 is optional and the adoption rate varies by industry and 
firm size. We should also keep in mind that the mandatory retirement age means the 
age at which a person leaves his/her “prime work.” in Japan. Retired workers are 
sometimes provided an opportunity to be employed by the same or affiliated firms with 
lower incomes but flexible working conditions
5.   
 
3.2 Long-term trends of employment and unemployment 
Figure 3 presents long-term trends of the LFP of the old, as well as the LFP and 
unemployment of the young between 1965 and 2005, pooling genders. The LFP and 
unemployment are expressed as a percentage of the total population for each age group. 
The figure also shows the dates of key social security reforms with dotted lines for 
reference, which correspond to those in Table 1. 
We confirm the following facts. First, there is no relationship between the LFP or 
unemployment of the young and the dates of social security reforms, which have been 
exogenously determined by laws. This is also the case for the 1985 Reform, which was the 
largest revision to the social security programs in Japan. Second, the LFP of the old and 
the LFP of the young have been moving in parallel over the medium term, although over 
the long term the former shows an upward trend (probably due to extended mandatory 
retirement ages) and the latter shows a downward trend (probably due to increasing 
demand for higher educational attainment). Third, we find no clear correlation in the 
short-term movements of the old LFP and the unemployment of the young, while both of 
                                                      
5 Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish changes in the routes to retirement due to a lack of information available 
from published statistics. Indeed, OECD (2004) shows that the effective retirement age, which is defined as 
the average age at which workers aged 40 or above retire, is 70 and 66 years old for Japanese males and 
females, respectively, for 1997-2002. 
  8them have long-term upward trends. 
Figure 4 compares the LFP of the old, the unemployment of the young, and the 
unemployment of the prime age group. If the LFP of the old and that of the younger age 
groups are substitutes, the LFP of the old and the unemployment of the younger age 
groups would have moved in the same directions. To be sure, such movements are 
observed around 1980 and during the 1990s. During the mid-1960s and the mid-1970s, 
however, a reduction in the LFP of the old was not accompanied by a fall in the 
unemployment of the younger age groups. Moreover, the LFP of the old and 
unemployment in the younger age groups have been moving clearly in opposite directions 
since around 2000. Such observations confirm that unemployment in the younger age 
groups has been uncorrelated with the LFP of the old. 
Figure 5 compares long-term trends in LFP of the old, young, and prime age groups. 
The LFP of the prime age group shows a moderate upward trend, while the LFP curves of 
the young and old show cyclical movements. This fact suggests that employment 
adjustments by Japanese firms tend to concentrate on employment of the young and old, 
keeping the core labor force of the prime age group intact against cyclical fluctuations of 
business conditions.   
In all, Figures 3-5 do not support the view that jobs for the old crowd out jobs for the 
young. Rather, employment of the old and employment of the young tend to move in the 
same direction. This is presumably the main reason why Japanese policymakers have 
never considered early retirement policies to promote employment of the young. 
 
3.4 OLS regressions for the direct relationship 
Next, we run several regressions to reveal the direct relationship between the LFP of the 
old and the employment/unemployment of the younger age groups. There are five 
  9dependent variables: unemployment (UE), employment (EMP): and in-school (SCH) for the 
young, and unemployment (UE) and employment (EMP) for the prime age group. The key 
independent variable is the LFP or employment of the old. When using the LFP of the old in 
a regression, all labor force variables are measured as a rate of the total population of each 
age group, and men and women are combined. First, we use only the LFP or employment 
of the old as an explanatory variable with no controls, and then add real GDP per capita, its 
growth, and manufacturing share as controls.   
      We consider four specifications for OLS regressions:   
z  regress levels on levels; 
z  regress the dependent variables on a three-year lag of elderly LFP or employment; 
z  take the five-year differences for all the RHS and LHS variables; and, 
z  take the log of all variables and take five-year differences. 
Table 2 summarizes the regression results when we take the LFP of the old as the key 
independent variable. Reported are the estimated coefficients on the LFP of the old. The 
upper and lower panels present the results with no controls and with controls, respectively. 
The following facts are noteworthy. 
Regarding the unemployment of the young, the results are mixed: three of eight 
specifications show significant and positive coefficients while others have negative but 
insignificant ones. Mixed results are also observed for unemployment in the prime age 
group. In addition to the three specifications, a significant negative coefficient is observed in 
the five-year lag difference model. Hence, we cannot obtain definite results on the 
relationship between the LFP of the old and the unemployment of the younger age groups. 
Turning to the employment of the young, we do not find any significant correlation with 
the LFP of the old if we include no controls. With controls, however, all specifications 
produce significant and positive coefficients. In the case of the employment of the prime 
  10age group, in all specifications, the coefficients are positive and significant both with and 
without controls. These results indicate that the LEP of the old and employment of the 
younger age groups move in the same direction and contradict the view that employment of 
the old and employment of the younger age groups are substitutes. If we take in-school 
rate as a dependent variable, we do not obtain any significant coefficient if we include no 
controls, but we have significant and negative coefficients in two specifications with controls. 
This negative correlation could be spurious because a long-term uptrend of the in-school 
rate probably reflects a long-term increase of demand for higher education. In fact, there is 
no significant correlation within the difference specifications. 
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients when we replace the LFP of the old with their 
employment. While the basic picture remains the same as that shown in Table 2, we find 
the following facts. First, the UE models tend to have negative and even significant 
coefficients for both the young and the prime age groups in more cases. This implies little 
possibility that the LFP of the old caused unemployment in the younger age groups. 
Second, when we regress EMP of the young on the LFP of the old, we observe three 
significant, positive coefficients. These results also support the view that employment of the 
old and that of the younger age groups tend to move in the same direction. 
 
4. Inducements to retire and labor market outcomes 
 
4.1 Incentive measures: SSW and PV 
In this section we investigate the relationship between inducements for the old to exit the 
labor force and the employment and unemployment of the young. To facilitate this analysis, 
we construct a simple summary indicator of the inducement of the old to leave the labor 
force. The indicator should capture key aspects of inducements such as eligibility age, 
  11benefit level given eligibility, and change in the benefit if the receipt of benefits is delayed 
(essentially an actuarial adjustment when retirement is delayed).   
The core for constructing the inducement indicator is EPI benefits. Most NPI members 
are self-employed and their retirement decisions are not closely linked to social security 
benefits, and flat-rate NPI benefits are not means-tested and adjusted actuarially fairly if 
claimed at ages other than the normal eligibility age of 65. Moreover, the MAI, which covers 
employees in the public sector, has almost the same benefit scheme as the EPI, so we can 
reasonably treat MAI pensioners as if they were EPI members
6.  
The basic strategy for constructing inducement measures is as follows. First, we 
construct social security wealth, SSW (see Appendix 2, which explains in detail how to 
construct it). If one retires at age a and the eligibility age is a*, social security benefit 
received at age a, B(a) is calculated as: 
   if  ; =0 if    () ( ) m a CAMI k C a B , * + =
* a a ≥
* a a <
where C is a constant term corresponding to the basic pension benefit, k is a benefit 
multiplier, and CAMI (a, m) is the career average monthly income at age a and with months 
of service m. The values of a and m are estimated from published data. Then, (gross) SSW 
at age a, W(a), is calculated as: 




                                                     
where π(a) is a cumulative discount factor that reflects both interest rate (which is assumed 
to be three percent) and mortality (which is available from official statistics). D is the 
maximum age, which we set at 100. 
At age a, one can expect social security benefit and SSW if he/she retires at age a+j as 
 
6  Meanwhile, we are forced to ignore the impact of the means-tested Zaishoku benefits and wage subsidies on 
the elderly’s decisions to retire, due to a lack of data available from official statistics. A more comprehensive 
analysis, which takes into account multiple benefit schemes, should be an important topic for future research. 
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where wage is the projected wage based on cross-section data at the year when one is 
aged a. We then calculate the peak value for each age, PV(a) defined as 
      () () ( ) ( ) [ ]. , , 1 , max D W a W a W a PV L + =  
That is, PV(a) is the maximum value of SSW, which is obtained by adjusting the timing 
of retirement. We take into account a change in C and k reflecting each social security 
reform when calculating SSW and PV. In actual estimations, we choose the cohort born in 
1935 as the base cohort, and use its fixed earnings trajectories to address possible 
endogeneity of earnings in response to social security reforms. 
 
4.2 Inducement measure 
The next task is to construct the inducement measure utilizing SSW, PV, and labor force 
participation. Assuming that at given age a and year y, SSW per capita, proportion of 
people in the labor force, and number of retirees are given as W(a, y), LFP(a, y), and P(a, 
y), respectively. Then, averaging W(a, y) over different age groups —specifically over 55 
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which gauges the overall generosity of social security benefits at each year.   
It is reasonable to assume that an individual considers not only the level of SSW by 
itself, but also potential gains from postponing retirement when deciding to continue 
working or retire. Hence, we additionally consider W(a, y)-PV(a, y), which is the difference 
  13between the SSW an individual obtains by retiring at age a and the maximum SSW he or 
she can obtain by postponing retirement from that age. In Japan, the value of W(a, y)-PV(a, 
y) is expected to be negative before the eligibility age, and zero beyond that. As in the case 
of SSW, we obtain the annual average of W(a, y)-PV(a, y): 
[] () ()
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Finally, we combine SSW and its potential gain from postponing retirement to construct 
the inclusive incentive measure, which is defined as: 
      () () () ( ) [ y a PV y a W y a W y a I , , , , ] − + ≡ α ,                               
where α is a nonnegative parameter. In addition, averaging I(a, y) over age, we calculate its 
annual average as 
() () [] () y PV W y W y I − + = α .                                             ( 3 )  
A higher value of SSW itself makes an individual more inclined to retire, but its disincentive 
effect is partly offset by potential gains from postponing retirement. Putting these two 
factors together, the inclusive incentive indicator captures the net effect of social security 
benefits. The value of the weight on  PV W − ,  α, should be estimated empirically as 
discussed in the next subsection. 
   It is useful to examine whether annual average incentives are consistent with the 
expected effects of past reforms. Figure 6 depicts the LFP-weighted averages of male and 
female  W  at 2005 prices for the 1935 cohort. Because  PV W − is almost flat compared 
to  W , it suffices to look at  W to capture the long-term trend of the inducement of retire. 
The figure shows that the level of  W continued to rise until the mid-1980s, then started 
to decline gradually, and has remained roughly stable since the late 1980s. This trend is 
consistent with the history of social security reforms, which is summarized in Table 1. Until 
  14the mid-1980s, the government had continued to increase the generosity of the programs 
by increasing the flat-rate benefit as well as the benefit multiplier for the wage-proportional 
benefit. The 1985 Reform, however, decisively changed the policy direction by reducing the 
generosity of the benefit formulae. Since the 1989 Reform, the government has been 
raising the flat-rate benefit but subduing the overall generosity of the program by reducing 
the benefit multiplier, postponing the eligibility age, and reducing the benefit indexation. 
 
4.3 Estimation methodologies 
We now move to the relationship between the measure for inducement to retire and 
employment and unemployment of younger age groups. Figures 7 compares the trends of 
unemployment and  W . There seems to have been a negative correlation between the two 
since the late 1980s, but a clear upward trend in the unemployment rate makes it difficult to 
interpret the relationship. Figure 8 replaces unemployment with employment and 
compares it with W . We find that until the 1990s employment of the young and W  
moved in opposite directions, while there seems to be no clear relationship between 
employment of the prime age group and  W . We have to control other factors that are likely 
to affect labor market outcomes, however, to precisely capture the impact of the 
inducement to retire on labor outcomes of the younger age groups,   
In addition, we have to estimate the weight on  PV W − , α, in eq. (2). We use two 
methods. The first method is the iteration procedure. The estimation model here is given by 
      () () ( ) [ ]( ) { } , y y y y OLD e X y PV W y W e X y I y LFP + + − + = + + = β α δ β δ     ( 4 )  
where Xy is a vector of covariates. We iterate over α with 0.25 intervals starting at zero and 
regress LFP of the old on  I  and on covariates to search the value of α that gives the 
highest R
2. δ is expected to be negative.   
The second is the regression procedure. The estimation model in this case is given by 
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We regress LFP of the old on W  and  PV W −  as well as covariates to estimate 
coefficients on  W  and  PV W − separately, that is, δ1 and δ2. Then, we obtain the implied 
weight, α, by calculating δ2/δ1. 
After estimating α based on either of these two methods, we regress labor market 
outcomes on the estimated I , which is based on either of the two methods, and 
covariates. We conduct these two procedures using not only the levels for all variables in 
eqs. (4) and (5) but also their five-year differences, because most of the variables have 
strong time trends. In all estimation models, we use real GDP per capita, its growth rate, 
share of manufacturing in GDP, and one-year difference in the share of the elderly of total 
population. The estimation period is between 1975 and 2007 due to data limitations. As 
already implied by Figures 7 and 8, regressions based on the levels might lead to a 
spurious relationship between inducement measure and labor market outcomes. 
 
4.4 Estimation results 
Table 4 presents estimation results using the level of each variable. The upper panel 
summarizes the estimated parameters of I . The first method obtains 8.75 for the 
estimated value of α. The second method obtains -0.512 and -4.419 for the estimated 
values of δ1 and δ2, respectively, implying that α is equal to 8.63, which is very close to 8.75. 
These high estimated values of α suggest that a change in  PV W −  affects the elderly’s 
retirement decision much more than a change in  W  per se
7. This means that the elderly 
are much more sensitive to potential gains from postponing retirement than the level of 
social security wealth obtained by retiring at each age. 
                                                      
7 Actually, we compare two cases: the first assuming that each individual is completely liquidity constrained so 
that W(a, y) is treated as zero before the (first) eligibility age, and the second assuming that there is no liquidity 
constraint so that W(a, y) is not treated as zero. We focus on the latter case, which makes a much better fit in 
the model and obtains reasonable coefficients. 
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and the young. We regress the LFP of the old, and unemployment, employment, and 
in-school of the young at the level of estimated  I   (based on estimated α) and covariates. 
In addition, we consider three cases: 1) using implied I  weighing from the iteration 
procedure ( I =W +8.75 [] PV W − ); 2) using implied I  weighing from the regression 
procedure ( I =W +8.63[] PV W − ); and, 3) using the estimated regression coefficients 
directly (I =0.512W +4.4719[] PV W − ), which is expected to obtain -1 as the coefficient on 
I .  
The following findings are noteworthy. First, using the weights on W and  PV W −  
determined by the iteration procedure (α=8.75) or by the regression procedure (converted 
by the ratio translation to 1 and 8.75) yields essentially the same results. This fact is 
confirmed by comparing the results reported in 1) and 2) in the lower panel. Second, the 
implied  I  is very strongly related to the LFP of the old. The coefficient of implied  I  is 
very significant and stable across specifications, indicating that our measure of the 
inducement to retire successfully captures the impact on the elderly’s decisions on 
retirement. Third, the coefficients on the implied I  are significantly positive in the 
unemployment models. At the same time, however, we obtain positive and significant 
coefficients in the LFP models, suggesting that these level-on-level regressions capture 
spurious correlations between the inducement to retire for the elderly and labor market 
outcome for the young. Finally, the coefficients on the old LFP in the in-school models are 
negative and significant, which is difficult to understand. 
The estimation results based on five-year differences of all variables, which are 
summarized in Table 5, help us to check the robustness of the results based on the levels. 
We again obtain a relatively high value of α, which is 9.5 in the iteration procedure and 9.51 
in the regression procedure. This confirms that the elderly are more sensitive to potential 
  17gains from postponing retirement than social security wealth. Regarding the impact on 
labor market outcomes, we obtain very significant and negative coefficients on the LFP of 
the old across models as reported in Table 4.   
However, all the coefficients in the models of young unemployment, employment, and 
in-school turn insignificant in sharp contrast to the results reported in Table 4. There is no 
coefficient on the inducement measure that is statistically significant. This result indicates 
that the results from the level-on-level regressions are misleading, and that inducements to 




 We examined whether social security programs in Japan induce a withdrawal of the 
elderly from the labor force and create jobs for the young. First, we provided a historical 
overview of past social security reforms and employment policies for the elderly. Following 
this overview, we investigated the direct relationship between employment/unemployment 
of the young and employment of the old. Second, we explored whether social security 
induced a withdrawal of the old from the labor force and created jobs for the young. 
The key messages are summarized as follows. First, our historical overview suggests 
that young unemployment issues have not motivated social security reforms and that 
changes in provisions are not endogenous with respect to young 
employment/unemployment. Second, the employment of the young tends to be positively, 
not negatively, associated with the LFP of the old. Third, the inducement to retire for the 
elderly does not significantly affect the labor market outcome for the young. These findings 
confirm that there is no serious trade-off between the old and the young in the labor force.   
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Appendix 1. Data description 
 
This appendix summarizes the data construction and data sources for the main variables used in 
the figures and tables.   
 
(1) Labor force, employment, and unemployment 
The numbers of labor force, employment, and unemployment are available from the “Labor Force 
Survey” (Rodoryoku Chosa) compiled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications. This 
Survey has the LFP and other employment data by five-year age brackets. We sum up the figures in 
published tables to make those data for the young, prime age, and old groups in each year. 
 
(2) GDP per capita 
The annual GDP data in 2005 constant prices is available from the “Annual Report on National 
Accounts” (Kokumin Keizai Keisan Nenpo) published by the Economic and Social Research Institute, 
Cabinet Office. The population data for each year are available from the Annual Report on 
Population Estimates ( Jinko Suikei Nenpo) compiled by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and 
Communications. 
 
(3) Real wages (monthly salary in real terms) 
The data on nominal regular monthly wage are taken from the “Basic Survey on Wage Structure” 
(Chingin Kozo Kihon Tokei Chosa), which is compiled by the Ministry of Health, Labor and Wealth 
(MHLW). The Survey contains the most comprehensive wage data in Japan, and provides 
tabulations on the average and population weights by (mostly) five-year age brackets. Nominal wage 
is converted into real terms by CPI. 
 
 
Appendix 2. Construction of social security wealth (SSW) 
 
   This appendix provides a detailed description of data used to construct SSW, as well as the 
limitations of the data and calculations. 
 
  19I. Data descriptions and sources 
 
(1) Eligibility ages 
First, we define the eligibility ages for receiving pension benefits. Information on eligibility age for 
each cohort is available from the MHLW. We consider the eligibility ages for both the flat-rate and 
wage-proportional pension benefits for the Employees’ Pension Insurance program. See Figure 1. 
  
(2) Months of premium contributions 
Second, we collect the months of premium contributions. The “Annual Report of the Social Insurance 
Agency” (Shakai Hoken Cho Jigyo Nenpo) provides the average months of contributions for the 
retired who initially claim benefits. For simplicity we assume that these figures are entirely for those 
who retired at the eligibility age, because most beneficiaries start to receive benefits at the eligibility 
age. Indeed, 79.3% of EPI beneficiaries initially claimed their benefit at age 60 (which was the first 
eligibility age) in 2005 according to the latest “Annual Report.” 
There were no data before 1988 except averages of pooled genders for 1981-1985 and for 1971 
(from “Annual report on Health and Welfare” published by MHLW). Hence, we first interpolate data 
for pooled genders for 1986 and 1987 using the figures in 1985 and 1988. Second, we interpolate 
data for 1972-1980 and for 1960-1970 using the trend after 1971. Third, we estimate the data for 
each gender using information on the proportion of those for males to the total for 1988-1992, and 
then calculate the corresponding figures for females.   
 
(3) Career average monthly income (CAMI) 
Third, we compute the career average monthly income (CAMI) for each gender. The data are 
available from the “Annual Report of the Social Insurance Agency.” Similar to the months of 
contributions, there were no data before 1988 except averages of pooled genders for 1981-1985. 
Because the proportion of the CAMI for workers before retirement to that for those who began to 
receive pension benefits was stable, we estimate the CAMI for retirees for 1960-1980 by multiplying 
the CAMI for workers (taken from the “Annual Report”) by the proportion between the two for the 
1988-1993 period for each gender.   
 
(4) Pension benefit formula and insurance premiums 
The “Recalculation of Fiscal Conditions” provides a formula to compute benefit levels. We assume 
that each change in the formula is effective in the following calendar year and insurance premium 
rate is common for all generations in a given year. See Table 1. 
 
(6) Wage rates for the old 
We calculate wage rates (excluding bonus payments) for those aged 55 to 69 in each age bracket by 
gender in each year. The “Basic Survey on Wage Structure” contains monthly nominal regular wages 
for five-year age brackets by gender, but not a more disaggregated level for those aged 65 and over. 
To estimate the average wage for each age, we assume that (i) the regular wages for each age 
between 55 and 59 is identical to the average of the age bracket; (ii) that for age 60 is equal to the 
average for the 60-64 bracket; and, (iii) that for those aged 68 and over is equal to the average for 
the 65 and over bracket. We obtain data for those aged 61-67 from a linear interpolation using data 
on those aged 60 and 68. Further, we assume that nominal wage for each age corresponds to that 
paid one year from birthday because most of the elderly are in the secondary labor market.   
 
(7) Mortality rates 
The mortality rate by each age and gender has been available annually since 1996 from the MHLW. 
Before 1996, published data were available for five-year age brackets only. We interpolate the death 
rate for each age using the age pattern in 1996. We assume that all persons die at age 100. 
 
 
II. Computation of SSW   
 
   We next compute SSW, following the steps below. Unfortunately, we cannot create the incentive 
  20measure separately by marital status or deciles of earnings distribution due to data limitations. 
Moreover, we cannot consider the weight for each route to retirement due to data availability.   
 
(1) Estimation of wages received when not retired 
We use the “Basic Survey on Wage Structure” to construct data on the monthly regular wages for 
each age 55-80 in a given year (ignoring bonus payments). We estimate earnings trajectories for the 
cohort born in 1935 and apply their earnings trajectories to other cohorts. 
 
(2) Estimation of pension benefits 
We obtain the average months of contributions and the average CAMI in a given year for those who 
reach the eligible age in each year from the “Annual Report of the Social Insurance Agency.” Hence, 
it is straightforward to estimate pension benefits if they start to receive them at the eligible age. 
Otherwise, we recalculate the months of contributions (for example, if a person extends a year to 
receive benefits, we add 12 months to months of contributions) and the CAMI (based on estimated 
wages, see (1) to obtain the pension benefits for each retired age. 
 
(3) Discount rates 
We compute cumulative discount rates based on the mortality and the interest rates. First, we 
calculate the probability of survival after 55 for each age by (1-mortality rate) in a given year 
(assuming that the person survives at 55) for each gender, using data on the mortality rate for each 
age bracket in a given year. Second, we add a three-percent interest rate to this probability of 
survival to obtain the aggregate discount rates. 
 
(4) Social security wealth (SSW) 
Assuming that all pensioners continue to receive the same benefit as that initially claimed at 
retirement until age 100, we compute the gross SSW by multiplying benefits and cumulative discount 
rates obtained from (3). No one is entitled to receive any benefits before the eligibility age. To 
compute net SSW, we consider insurance premiums to be paid during work until age 65. The current 
value of premiums is calculated by multiplying monthly regular wages by half of the premium rate 
and discounted by the discount factor. We then compute cumulative amount of present value of the 




Table 1. Changes in social security benefits in key reforms
Social security reform Wage-proportional benefit
Benefit multiplier (/1000) Nominal 2005 prices Nominal 2005 prices
1954 5 24,000 [   127,292] - -
1959 6 24,000 [   127,620] 42,000 [   223,336]
1965 10 120,000 [   473,412] 96,000 [   378,730]
1969 10 192,000 [   624,086] 153,600 [   499,269]
1973 10 480,000 [1,185,185] 384,000 [   948,148]
1976 10 624,000 [1,022,951] 624,000 [1,022,951]
1980 10 984,000 [1,279,584] 806,400 [1,048,635]
1985 7.5 600,000 [   681,044] 600,000 [   681,044]
1989 7.5 666,000 [   729,463] 666,000 [   729,463]
1994 7.5 780,000 [   773,810] 780,000 [   773,810]
2000 7.125 804,200 [   786,888] 804,200 [   786,888]
2004 7.125 804,200 [   801,795] 804,200 [   801,795]
(Note) 1. Flat-rate benefits in this table are calculated for beneficiaries who are assumed to have contributed premimus for 40 years in  1965 and after,
               while they were fixed regardless of years of contributions in 1954 and 59 reforms. During 1965 and 1980, the upper limit of years of 
               contribution was 25 years.
Employees' Pension Insurance National Pension Insurance
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Figure 2. Distribution of mandatry retirement ages set by firms
percent
(Notes) The "55" category includes a small number of firmswith mandatory retirement age of 54 and younger. Figuresare 
for firms with 30 or more employees.
(Source) Surveys on Employment Management, MHLW.
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Figure 3. LFP of the old and  LFP and unemployment of the young
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(Note) Dotted lines indicate the dates of key social security reforms.
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Figure 4. LFP of the old and unemployment of the young and prime age groups
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Figure 5. LFP of the old , young and prime age groups
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  24Table 2. Direct relationship between the elderly LFP and the employment and unemployment 
of young and prime age persons, men and women combined: 1965-2007
UE EMP SCH UE EMP
Levels 0.638
*** -0.406 -0.232 0.353
*** 0.958
***
(0.128) (0.318) (0.215) (0.074) (0.134)
3 year lag on elderly  0.535
*** -0.178 -0.357 0.313
*** 0.411
***
employment (0.150) (0.343) (0.224) (0.085) (0.203)
5 year difference -0.057 0.431 -0.374 -0.054 0.593 ***
(0.072) (0.281) (0.261) (0.045) (0.078)
5 year log difference -2.136 0.425 -1.051 -2.254 0.508
***
(1.392) (0.254)  (0.716) (1.397) (0.066)
Levels 0.108 0.887 *** -0.996 *** 0.065 0.336 ***
(0.066) (0.207) (0.193) (0.044) (0.072)






employment (0.052) (0.199) (0.178) (0.036) (0.074)
5 year difference -0.017 0.429 *  -0.412 -0.026 0.541 ***
(0.052) (0.258) (0.252) (0.023) (0.063)




(1.389) (0.261) (0.764) (1.026) (0.064)
(Notes) Reported is the coefficient on elderly LFP.
Controls include real GDP per capita, growth in real GDP per capita, and manufacturing ratio.
Levels regression means that we regress levels on levels.
3 year difference means that we regress the dependent variables on a 3 year lag of elderly LFP.
5 year difference means that we take 5 year differences for the RHS and the LHS variables.
5 year log difference means that we take the log of each X and Y variable, then take 5 year differences.
***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
With Controls
Specification Youth 20-24 Prime Age 25-54
No Controls
  25Table 3. Direct relationship between the elderly employment and the employment and unemployment 
of young and prime age persons, men and women combined: 1965-2007
UE EMP SCH UE EMP
Levels 0.129 0.566 -0.695 *** 0.069  0.599 ***
(0.174) (0.339) (0.208) (0.099) (0.195)
3 year lag on elderly  -0.059 0.832
*** -0.773
*** -0.031  -0.175
employment (0.162) (0.298) (0.181) (0.092) (0.199)





(0.057) (0.234) (0.222) (0.036) (0.060)










(0.060) (0.185) (0.181) (0.040) (0.066)
3 year lag on elderly  0.115
** 0.740
*** -0.855
*** 0.053  0.210
***
employment (0.052) (0.166) (0.150) (0.035) (0.065)




(0.046) (0.230) (0.228) (0.020) (0.060)





(1.027) (0.203) (0.603) (0.677) (0.052)
(Notes) Reported is the coefficient on elderly employment.
Controls include real GDP per capita, growth in real GDP per capita, and manufacturing ratio.
Levels regression means that we regress levels on levels.
3 year difference means that we regress the dependent variables on a 3 year lag of elderly LFP.
5 year difference means that we take 5 year differences for the RHS and the LHS variables.
5 year log difference means that we take the log of each X and Y variable, then take 5 year differences.
***, **, and * are significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
With Controls
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Figure 6. Annual average SSW (Wbar) 
2005 prices, 1000 euro
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Figure 7. Unemployment of the young and  prime age groups and the inducement to retire
Wbar
(right scale)
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Figure 8. Employment of young and prime age groups and inducement to retire
percent of  population
Wbar
(right scale)
2005 prices, 1000 euro
Employment of the young
 
  28Table 4. Effect of inducement to retire on labor market outcomes (levels): 1975-2007
Estimating the parameters of Ibar gamma alpha
alpha
/gamma R
2 Implied  Ibar weighting
1 8.75 8.75 0.9410 1*W+8.75*(W-PV)
    
 
-0.512 *** -4.419 ** 8.63 0.9410 -0.512*W-4.419*(W-PV)
(0.158) (2.113) or 1*W+8.63*(W-PV)
Estimating inducement to retire on outcomes for the old and the young, using  Ibar  and covariates
1) Using implied Ibar weighting from 1) above R
2
Coef Std error
LFP of old -0.511 *** (0.143) 0.9410
Unemployment of young 0.324 ** (0.143) 0.9385
Employment of young 0.855 * (0.437) 0.8006
School of young -1.179 *** (0.358) 0.7624
 
2) Using implied Ibar weighting from 2) above: R
2  
1*W+8.63*(W-PV) Coef Std error
LFP of old -0.512 *** (0.144) 0.9410
Unemployment of young 0.326 ** (0.144) 0.9387
Employment of young 0.842 * (0.441) 0.7994
School of young -1.168 *** (0.362) 0.7596
3) Using implied Ibar weighting from 2) above: R
2
-0.512*W-4.419*(W-PV) Coef Std error
LFP of old -1.000 *** (0.282) 0.9410
Unemployment of young 0.637 ** (0.280) 0.9387
Employment of young 1.646 * (0.863) 0.7994
School of young -2.283
*** (0.708) 0.7596
Notes: Covariates include real GDP per capita, growth in real GDP per capita, the share of manufacturing in GDP, and the one-year difference in the share of th
All depenbdent variables are percent rates. Inducement measres are at 2005 prices, '000,000 Euro.




1) Iterating over α with 0.25 intervals and
regressing LFP of old on Ibar and covariates













  29Table 5. Effect of inducement to retire on labor market outcomes (5 year differences): 1975-2007
Estimating the parameters of Ibar gamma alpha
alpha
/gamma R
2 Implied  Ibar weighting
1 9.5 9.5 0.5956 1*W+9.5*(W-PV)
-0.608 *** -5.781 * 9.51 0.5956 -0.608*W-5.781*(W-PV)
(0.174) (3.241) or 1*W+9.51*(W-PV)
Estimating inducement to retire on outcomes for the old and the young, using  Ibar  and covariates
1) Using implied Ibar weighting from 1) above R
2
Coef Std error
LFP of old -0.608 *** (0.175) 0.5956
Unemployment of young 0.020   (0.100) 0.7606
Employment of young 0.169   (0.250) 0.7537
School of young -0.189   (0.307) 0.5471
 
2) Using implied Ibar weighting from 2) above: R
2
1*W+9.51*(W-PV) Coef Std error  
LFP of old -0.608 *** (0.175) 0.5956
Unemployment of young 0.020   (0.100) 0.7606
Employment of young 0.170   (0.250) 0.7538  
School of young -0.190   (0.307) 0.5471  
3) Using implied Ibar weighting from 3) above:   R
2
-0.608*W-5.781*(W-PV) Coef Std error
LFP of old -1.000 *** (0.288) 0.5956
Unemployment of young 0.033   (0.164) 0.7606
Employment of young 0.280   (0.412) 0.7538
School of young -0.313
  (0.505) 0.5471
Notes: Covariates include real GDP per capita, growth in real GDP per capita, the share of manufacturing in GDP, and the one-year difference in the share of th
All depenbdent variables are percent rates. Inducement measres are at 2005 prices, '000,000 Euro.
*** and * are significant at 1% and 10% levels, respectively.
Ibar
Ibar
1) Iterating over α with 0.25 intervals and
regressing LFP of old on Ibar and covariates
2)Time series regression of LFP of old on Wbar
and (W-PV)bar
Ibar
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